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HEALTH LAW
INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a national health care plan, it is not surprising that the
states play a crucial role in certain areas of health care. Although the federal
government has preempted state regulation of ERISA health insurance plans,
the states retain a significant amount of control. Three Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases discussed below illustrate this phenomenon.
The first case, Hern v. Beye,' addressed state funding of abortions for
women dependent on Medicaid. In Hem, the State of Colorado, in contraven-
tion of the current Hyde Amendment, refused to fund abortions in cases of
rape or incest. The court held that if Colorado chose to accept federal Medic-
aid funds, it could not refuse to comply with the federal mandate.2
The second and third cases, decided simultaneously, together address two
key provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).3 In Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital,' the court defined
"appropriate medical screening."5 In Urban v. King,6 it qualified EMTALA's
requirement that a hospital stabilize emergency medical conditions before
transferring a patient. Together, these cases help realize congressional intent
by preventing EMTALA from acting as a national malpractice statute.
I. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Background
1. Federal Funding for Abortions: Medicaid and the Hyde Amendment
Title XIX of the Social Security Act created the Medicaid Program in
1965.' This cooperative program allows a state to electively participate in the
Medicaid program provided the state meets specific requirements.8 Once these
requirements are met, participating states receive federal matching funds to
provide medical care for qualified individuals. Under Title XIX, states must
furnish categories of care deemed "mandatory." 9 Although Title XIX's
1. 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
2. Hem, 57 F.3d at 913; see also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No. 95-1242, 1996 WL 327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996) (finding un-
constitutional a Utah statute challenging the validity of abortion rights defined under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Jane L. is discussed in the Civil Rights section of this Survey Issue at pp.
688-91.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
4. 43 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
6. 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Mandatory care categories include "inpatient hospital services... ; outpatient hospital
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preamble requires states to provide "necessary medical services," it does not
define what specific procedures fall within these mandatory categories.'"
States, however, are not limited to the provision of these mandatory services
and may, at their election, provide additional medical care."
Congress has not defined "medically necessary," but since 1976 has pro-
hibited or limited Medicaid funding for abortions. 2 Each annual renewal of
the Hyde Amendment specifies which types of abortions Medicaid will
fund. 3 Congress attaches these specifications to appropriation bills for the
Department of Health and Human Services. 4 In the past, Hyde Amendments
restricted Medicaid funding to those abortions necessary to save the life of the
mother. 5 President Clinton succeeded in lifting the virtual ban on federally
funded abortions only to the extent that the 1994 Hyde Amendment allowed
Medicaid funding for abortions in cases of rape or incest, as well as to save
the life of the mother.
6
In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court settled the issue of whether the gov-
ernment may refuse to fund abortions. 7 In Maher, the Court upheld a Con-
necticut regulation that provided funding for childbirth, but limited state Med-
icaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those diagnosed as "medically
necessary."'" The Court concluded that a state can favor childbirth over abor-
tion provided the regulation does not constitute a governmental restriction on
access to abortions. 9
Three years later, in Harris v. McRae," the Supreme Court held that
states participating in the Medicaid program need not fund abortions for which
the Hyde Amendment restricts federal funds.2' Furthermore, the Court held
that the Hyde Amendment's funding restrictions do not violate a woman's
services ... ; other laboratory and X-ray services; nursing facility services ... ; early and period-
ic screening, diagnostic and treatment services [for minors]; family planning services...
physicians' services furnished by a physician." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(5).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1396d(a)(25).
12. Stephen C. Ferlman, Does the Illinois Medicaid Program Meet Title XIX's Requirement
That States Provide "Medically Necessary" Services?, 28 Soc. SECURITY REPORTING SERV. 708
(1990).
13. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
14. The original Hyde Amendment was enacted with Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1418 (1976). The amendments are named for Henry Hyde, who is now the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee and is staunchly anti-choice. Carla M. DaLuz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Will
the New Republican Majority in Congress Wage Old Battles Against Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 501, 507 (1995) (examining how the 104th Congress may restrict access to abortion, impact
the Family and Medical Leave Act, alter military policies toward gay men and lesbians, and affect
welfare reform). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld Congress's right to limit Medicaid funding
for abortions. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
15. DaLuz & Weckerly, supra note 14, at 512.
16. Id.
17. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
18. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466, 480 (using a physician's certification to define "medically nec-
essary").
19. Id. at 475-76. The Maher Court also rejected the argument that the Connecticut regula-
tion violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment on the basis that indigence
is not a recognized suspect classification. Id. at 470-71.
20. 448 U.S. 297, appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1980).
21. Harris, 448 U.S. at 309-11.
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liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor her
right to equal protection of the laws.2 No constitutional provision requires
that states fund all legally available medical services.23 Thus, the Court deter-
mined that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of
its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category." '24 Hence the Hyde
Amendment bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of
"protecting the potential life of the fetus."25
The McRae decision has prompted strong reaction from legal scholars,
many of whom criticize it for its narrow constitutional tailoring of the Hyde
Amendment.26 The foregoing cases provided the backdrop for the Tenth
Circuit's decision on the ability of the states to restrict abortion funds beyond
the limits of the Hyde Amendment.
2. Colorado's Constitutional and Statutory Ban on State-Funded
Abortions
Colorado, one of many states with pro-life legislatures, viewed the 1994
Hyde Amendment as an infringement on state authority.27 In April 1994, state
officials vowed to defy a federal order instructing them to comply with the
new funding guidelines, and instead swore to uphold the state constitution as
22. Id.
23. Id. at 326.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. at 324 (utilizing the minimum rationality standard of state action review).
26. There are two primary criticisms of the standards applied in McRae. First, the Court
refused to identify pregnancy as a gender issue, subject to suspect classification. See generally
Ruth Colker, Equality Theory and Reproductive Freedom, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 99 (1994) (ar-
guing that reproductive freedom should be a gender, not a privacy, issue because privacy does not
focus on the economic inequities faced by disadvantaged women); see also Julie F. Kay, If Men
Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for Federal Funding of Abortion Under a Na-
tional Health Care Plan, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 349, 385 (1994) (proposing equal protection for gen-
der as a suspect class); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593,
618 (1990) (noting that abortion statutes are inherently discriminatory, as they uniquely burden
women). At least one commentator argues that the Hyde Amendment impacts women of color so
disproportionately that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied. David R. Baron, The Racially
Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public Funding of Abortion: An Analysis of Current Equal
Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C. TMRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1993). Second, by asserting that indigent
women have the same right to obtain an abortion as any other woman, the Court disregards the
economic reality of pregnant Medicaid recipients. See Colker, supra, at 1435; Donald P. Judges,
Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REv.
1323, 1434-41 (1995); Kay, supra, at 351.
At least one state court has agreed with the commentators. In Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986), the court noted the paradox for a pregnant Medicaid recipient: she is
financially destitute by definition, and if she accepts an unreported personal loan to pay for an
abortion, she jeopardizes her benefits. "[TJhe state has boxed her into accepting the pregnancy and
carrying the fetus to term, notwithstanding the sometimes substantial impairment to her health."
This reality, the court observed, forced some women to "resort[] to desperate and dangerous acts
of self-abortion, criminal activity and illegal abortions in order to exercise their constitutional
rights." Id. at 154.
27. Robert H. Freilich et al., The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small
Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW. 623, 635 (1994). Similar state restrictions of the
Hyde Amendment were attacked in Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania. Id.
1996]
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amended by Colorado voters.28 The amendment in question added the follow-
ing language to the Colorado Constitution:
No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its agencies
or political subdivisions to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly
or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of
any induced abortion, PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the General
Assembly, by specific bill, may authorize and appropriate funds to be
used for those medical services necessary to prevent the death of
either a pregnant woman or her unborn child under circumstances
where every reasonable effort is made to preserve the life of each.29
Hern v. Beye ° was the first federal ruling addressing state funding restric-
tions which contravened the 1994 Hyde Amendment. Judge Nottingham of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado enjoined Colorado from en-
forcing the constitutional amendment.3
The Tenth Circuit had twice before addressed state regulations that were
more restrictive than federal rules for Medicaid-funded abortions. In D.R. v.
Mitchell,32 the plaintiff challenged a Utah statute limiting state funding of
abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother. The Tenth Circuit
focused on the fact that Congress passed different versions of the Hyde
Amendment from 1978 to 1981, and changed restrictions on federally funded
abortions each year.33 The court found that Utah's statute required more re-
strictive funding than the Hyde Amendment in three of the four years exam-
ined.34 The appellant, an unmarried pregnant female, claimed that these re-
strictions violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by failing to
comply with relevant federal funding statutes.35 Because the plaintiff in D.R.
lacked standing, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the specific issue of whether
the Supremacy Clause applied.36
28. Bill Scanlon, State Officials Reject Federal Abortion Order; Colorado Joins Other States
in Refusing to Pay for Abortions in Cases of Rape, Incest, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 2, 1994, at
A20 (refusing to comply with the Hyde Amendment's "request") ("'Colorado is not going to com-
ply with the request,' Dr. David West, manager of health and medical services at the Colorado
Department of Social Services, said Friday.").
29. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50. The constitutional mandate is codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 26-4-105.5 (repealed 1991), 26-4-512, 26-15-104.5 (1989), and 10 COLO. CODE REGs. § 2505-
10(8.733) (1977) (emphasis in original).
30. No. CIV.A. 93-N-2350, 1994 WL 192366 (D. Colo. May 12, 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 906
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
31. Hem, 1994 WL 192366, at *1.
32. 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. D.R., 645 F.2d at 853.
34. Id.
35. D.R. also claimed that the Utah statute violated her equal protection and privacy rights
under the U.S. Constitution. Id.
36. Id. at 854 (holding that a plaintiff who had not been certified as a member of a class did
not have standing to sue for the failure of the state to comply with the federal law during the three
years in question when the plaintiff fell into the year in which the state statute was less restric-
tive). The court noted that the Supreme Court had expressly passed over the Supremacy Clause
issue. Id. at 853. The Supreme Court "expressly did not determine whether 'a participating State
may not, consistent with Title XIX, withhold funding for those medically necessary abortions for
which federal reimbursement is available under the Hyde Amendment."' Id. (quoting Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 364 n.5 (1980)). When faced with Hem v. Beye, a case where the Tenth
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Restrictive regulations arose again in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Dandoy.37 In Dandoy, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the State of Utah
could refuse to reimburse a certified Medicaid provider who, without parental
consent, gave family planning advice to Medicaid-qualified unmarried mi-
nors." Title XIX provided funding for "family planning services and supplies
furnished (directly or under arrangements with others) to individuals of child-
bearing age (including minors who can be considered to be sexually active)
who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and sup-
plies."39 The defendant, the executive director of the Utah State Department
of Health, based her official refusal to reimburse the plaintiff on a Utah statute
with parental consent provisions that conflicted with the federal statute.' The
court noted that "'the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling
constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its
money allotments to the States shall be disbursed, and that any state law or
regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and conditions is to that extent
invalid."' 4 Utah's more restrictive terms were inconsistent, the court ex-
plained, because a state which chooses to participate in a federal program
voluntarily relinquishes its right to enforce a conflicting state regulation or
statute.42
B. Hem v. Beye43
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, who included a doctor and three facilities that provided
abortions, sued to enjoin the Colorado Department of Social Services from
enforcing the portions of the Colorado Constitution, statutes, and regulations
which forbade Colorado to fund abortions except when necessary to save the
life of the mother." The State Department of Social Services claimed that a
state choosing to participate in Medicaid is not required to fund an abortion
for which federal funds are available. 5 The state asked the court to find that
the language of the Hyde Amendment is merely permissive, allowing but not
requiring participating states to fund abortions due to rape or incest.' At is-
sue was whether Colorado's funding restrictions contravened Title XIX and its
Circuit certainly could have invoked the Supremacy Clause, the court chose instead to define
Colorado's spending limits in terms of an inappropriate refusal to fund a medically necessary
procedure as defined by the current Hyde Amendment: See infra text accompanying notes 43-75.
37. 810 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1987).
38. Dandoy, 810 F.2d at 986.
39. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C)). The language of that section is still effective.
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1988).
40. Dandoy, 810 F.2d at 986.
41. Id. at 988 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)).
42. Id. The court also noted that federal funds are a "rather large carrot" to accomplish fed-
eral goals. Id.
43. 57 F.3d 906 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
44. Hem, 57 F.3d at 907 (involving COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 26-4-
105.5, 26-4-512, 26-15-104.5 and 10 COLO. CODE REGs. § 2505-10 (8.733)).
45. Id. at 908.
46. Id. The preamble to the Hyde Amendment merely imposed its goals "as far as practi-
cable under the conditions in such state." 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
1996]
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regulations.' The district court held that because Colorado participates in the
Medicaid program, the state must fund abortions in cases of rape or incest for
Medicaid-eligible women.'
2. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.49 Con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"0
the Tenth Circuit stated that protecting "the life of the fetus that may become
a child" and encouraging childbirth are legitimate state interests.5 Once a
state chooses to participate in the optional Medicaid program, however, it must
comply with the provisions of Title XIX." Because Colorado participated in
Medicaid," the only relevant issue was whether Colorado's refusal to fund
abortions in cases of rape or incest contravened the requirements of Title XIX
and the accompanying regulations.54
While a state need not fund all medical services under the "mandatory
coverage" categories," the court noted that a state's discretion is limited if it
bases the restriction on the "degree of medical necessity." 6 Concluding that
Colorado's restrictive abortion funding "impermissibly discriminate[d] in its
coverage of abortions on the basis of a patient's diagnosis and condition,"57
the court found that limiting Medicaid funded abortions to life-threatening
cases "violate[d] the purpose of the Act and discriminate[d] in a proscribed
fashion.""
47. Hern, 57 F.3d at 909.
48. The District Court held, in part:
[The State Department of Social Services] is enjoined, so long as the State of Colorado
accepts federal funds under the Medicaid Act, from enforcing the provisions of Article
V, Section 50 of the Colorado Constitution. Defendant is further enjoined from enforc-
ing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-4-512, or 26-15-104.5, or any rules and regula-
tions implementing these statutes, insofar as those statutes or rules are more restrictive
than the terms of the current Hyde Amendment.... Defendant is free to follow Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 26-4-105 by "complying with federal requirements for a program of medical
assistance necessary for the state of Colorado [sic] to qualify for federal funds under
Title XIX of the social security act," as amended by the current Hyde Amendment.
Hem, 1994 WL 192366, at *2.
49. Hem, 57 F.3d at 909.
50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recognizing an individual's constitutional right to choose a pre-
viability abortion, the state's power to restrict post-viability abortions, and the state's important
interests in protecting the health of the woman and the potential life of the fetus).
51. Hem, 57 F.3d at 913 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
445 (1977)).
52. Id. at 909, 913 (finding that Colorado must distribute funds "on the terms established by
Congress").
53. Id. Participation is enabled through the Colorado Medical Assistance Act, CoLo. REv.
STAT. §§ 26-4-101 to -704 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
54. Hern, 57 F.3d at 909.
55. The court noted that abortion falls under several of the mandatory coverage categories,
including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), family
planning services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C), and physicians' services furnished by a physician,
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(5)(A). Herm, 57 F.3d at 910.
56. Hern, 57 F.3d at 910 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1995)) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979)) (finding the categorical refusal to fund only a specific, medically necessary procedure
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Participating states may deny funding for medically necessary procedures
"pursuant to a generally applicable funding restriction or utilization control
procedure," according to the court,59 but "a state law that categorically denies
coverage for a specific, medically necessary procedure except in those rare
instances when the patient's life is at stake is not a 'reasonable standard[]...
consistent with the objectives of [the Act] . . . ."" Since Colorado accepts
Medicaid funds, "it must do so on the terms established by Congress."'
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado's refusal to fund abortions in ac-
cordance with the Hyde Amendment was an unacceptable "limit based on the
patient's degree of medical necessity," rather than a Supremacy Clause viola-
tion.62 In discussing "medical necessity," the court distinguished between
"permissible discrimination based on degree of need and.., forbidden dis-
crimination based on medical condition."'63 Hem raises several questions,
however, when viewed in conjunction with a contemporaneous Tenth Circuit
abortion decision.
The Tenth Circuit held in Jane L. v. Bangerter" that a state's post-Casey
interest in protecting the life of a post-viability fetus does not justify jeopar-
dizing a mother's health for the sake of the fetus.65 "The importance of ma-
ternal health is a unifying thread that runs from Roe to Thornburgh and then
to Casey." Jane L. and Hern together posit the question whether a state
may permissibly refuse to fund a therapeutic abortion if the state funds
abortions at all. Hem creates a paradox: courts prohibit states from discrimi-
nating based on the diagnosis or condition of a patient,67 yet the Hyde
Amendment discriminates in this proscribed manner when it funds abortions in
cases of rape or incest, but not other medically necessary abortions.
Hem also raises the issue of whether, in the absence of a Hyde Amend-
ment definition of the medical necessity and funding requirements of certain
to be unreasonably inconsistent with Title XIX objectives).
59. Id at 911. Cited examples include: a reasonable definition and application of a funding
denial for "experimental" procedures, id. (citing Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (7th
Cir. 1993)), limits of 12 annual inpatient days and 18 annual outpatient hospital visits, id. (citing
Charleston Memorial Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1982)), or a limit of three
physician visits per month. Id. (citing Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1980)). The
court noted that the limit of 12 inpatient days met the needs of 88% of Medicaid recipients, the 18
outpatient visits met the needs of 99%, and the three physician visits per month had met the needs
of 96.1% of recipients in the year preceding Curtis. Id.
60. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)) (citation omitted).
61. id. at 913.
62. Id. at 910.
63. Id. (quoting Preterm, 591 F.2d at 126).
64. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No.
95-1242, 1996 WL 327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996).
65. Id. at 1504.
66. Id.
67. Hem, 57 F.3d at 910,
19961
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abortions, states may refuse to fund abortions, whether therapeutic or
nontherapeutic. 8 The court noted that
Title XIX "confers broad discretion on the States to adopt standards
for determining the extent of medical assistance" offered in their
Medicaid programs.... In addition, federal Medicaid regulations
expressly permit participating states to "place appropriate limits on a
service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization
control procedures."69
The Tenth Circuit has stated unequivocally that a mother's life may not be
jeopardized for the sake of the fetus.70 However, the court may allow states
to characterize refusal to fund abortions, particularly nontherapeutic abortions,
under some neutrally worded rubric (i.e., "outpatient elective surgical proce-
dures") that qualifies as a utilization control procedure.
D. Other Circuits
All federal courts that have addressed the Hem issue have held that states
may not act more restrictively than the Hyde Amendment's provisions. The
circuits are split, however, with regard to the rationale for that result.7' Some
courts rely upon the Supremacy Clause, while others apply the "medical ne-
cessity" test.
The Third and the Eighth Circuits have invoked the Supremacy Clause. In
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll, 2 the Third Circuit
determined that a state's reporting and physician notification requirements in
rape and incest cases may not be more restrictive than the Hyde Amendment
requirements. 3 The court stated that "[t]he Supremacy Clause requires inval-
idation of any state constitutional or statutory provision that conflicts with
federal law ... and compels compliance by participants in Title XIX federal
aid programs with federal law and regulations."' 4 The Eighth Circuit held that
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Beal, 432 U.S. at 444, and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d)).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
71. District courts are similarly split, with some invoking the Supremacy Clause and some
applying the "medical necessity test." Three courts have invoked the Supremacy Clause. Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Wessman, Civ. No. A3-94-36, 1995 WL 465830 (D.N.D. 1995); Planned
Parenthood v. Wright, No. 94 C 6886, 1994 WL 750638 (N.D. I11. 1994); Planned Parenthood
Affiliates of Michigan v. Engler, 860 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mich. 1994). One court used the "medi-
cal necessity" test. Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. Blouke, 850 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mont. 1994).
One court held that the state may not fund in contravention of Title XIX "[i]n accordance with the
overwhelming weight of authority," without either invoking the Supremacy Clause or the "medi-
cally necessary" test. Stangler v. Shalala, No. 94-4221-CV-C-5, 1994 WL 764104, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. 1994). Finally, one court refused a request for pre-enforcement review and dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources v. Shalala, No. 94-47, 1995 WL 465673,
at *6 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
72. 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cit. 1995).
73. Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 172. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute had no waiver
provision, while the Hyde Amendment did.
74. Id. at 178 (citations omitted). Elizabeth Blackwell reaffirmed the Third Circuit's earlier
decision in Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1980), which held that states must fund
abortions for those categories of pregnancies for which the Hyde Amendment allows funding.
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"the Arkansas state constitutional amendment and the Nebraska state regula-
tion prohibiting the use of public funds for abortions except to save the life of
the mother violate the federal Medicaid statute, as amended by the 1994 Hyde
Amendment, and are therefore invalid under the supremacy clause."75
The Fifth Circuit, like the Tenth, applied the "medical necessity" test in
Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards.76 That court found a Louisiana
statute
violate[d] the requirements of Title XIX because it categorically pro-
hibit[ed] funding for abortions in cases of rape or incest without re-
gard to whether the procedures might be medically necessary. The
defendants offer[ed] no medical basis for restricting abortions to life
and death situations, nor d[id] they contest the plaintiffs' position that
abortions in rape and incest cases are often medically necessary.77
II. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT (EMTALA)
A. Background
1. EMTALA Generally
Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 (COBRA)." Commonly known as the "emergency room anti-
dumping statute,"79 EMTALA's purpose is to assure that staffs of the
nation's emergency rooms accord all patients the same quality of screening,
regardless of their ability to pay.' Congress limited EMTALA's scope to
hospitals which receive Medicare or Medicaid payments.8 '
75. Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir. 1995).
76. 63 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1996) (No. 95-1164).
77. Hope Medical Group, 63 F.3d at 428. Louisiana asked the Supreme Court to stay the
district court's decision in Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards, 860 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D.
La. 1994), which required the state to either fund abortions in rape or incest cases, in contraven-
tion of a Louisiana statute, or forego the receipt of federal funds. Edwards v. Hope Medical Group
for Women, 115 S. Ct. 1, 1 (1994). In denying the motion, Justice Scalia stated that under the
appropriate standard of review:
The only issue potentially worthy of certiorari is the premise underlying the District
Court's decision: that Title XIX requires States participating in the Medicaid program to
fund abortions (at least "medically necessary" ones) unless federal funding for those
procedures is proscribed by the Hyde Amendments. The Courts of Appeals to address
this question have uniformly supported that premise.... We have already denied cer-
tiorari in two of those cases, and it is in my view a certainty that four Justices will not
be found to vote for certiorari on the Title XIX question unless and until a conflict in
the Circuits appears.
Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
79. Timothy H. Bosler & Patrick M. Davis, Is EMTALA a Defanged Cobra?, 51 J. MO. B.
165, 165 (1995).
80. John R. Penhallegon, What's Happening in... Medical Malpractice, 62 DEF. CoUNS. J.
426, 428 (1995).
81. Bosler & Davis, supra note 79, at 165.
1996]
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2. EMTALA's "Appropriate Medical Screening Requirement"
EMTALA mandates that anyone who enters an emergency room in need
of care receive an "appropriate medical screening. 8 2 If the hospital's staff
identifies an "emergency medical condition," 3 it may not transfer the patient
until stabilized." Among other terms, the act does not expressly define "ap-
propriate medical screening."
Courts do not limit the application of EMTALA to the indigent or unin-
sured. 5 The Tenth Circuit, in accord with other circuits,86 has held that
"[tihe fact that Congress, or some of its members, viewed COBRA as a so-
called 'anti-dumping' bill, i.e., a bill designed to prohibit hospitals from
'dumping' poor or uninsured patients in need of emergency care, does not
subtract from its broad term 'any individual." '
Although courts have expanded EMTALA to apply to anyone who goes to
an emergency room in need of care, and not merely the indigent, courts are
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). That section provides:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual
(whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency de-
partment and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment
for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department, including
ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, to determine whether
or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this
section) exists.
Id.
83. "Emergency medical condition" is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (in-
cluding severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reason-
ably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman,
the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the
unborn child.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l).
84. 42 U.S.C.§ 1395dd(c). The definition section of § 1395 provides:
The term "stabilized" means, with respect to an emergency medical condition described
in paragraph (1)(A), that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within rea-
sonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in para-
graph (1)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the placenta).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). The section also defines "transfer" as "the movement (including the
discharge) of an individual outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed
by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly, with) the hospital. " 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(e)(4).
85. Bosler & Davis, supra note 79, at 166.
86. In Collins v. DePaul Hosp., the Tenth Circuit cited the decisions of Gatewood v. Wash-
ington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Cleland v. Bronson Health Care
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir.
1992).
87. Collins, 963 F.2d at 308 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)). For the statutory language,
see supra note 81.
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cognizant that Congress enacted the legislation primarily to prevent hospitals
from dumping unwanted patients, and to penalize hospitals that do engage in
dumping-not to create a federal malpractice standard."s In Delaney v.
Cade, 9 the Tenth Circuit held that "the Act does not create a private cause of
action against physicians."9' More significantly, the court held in Collins v.
DePaul Hospital"t that a patient admitted to the hospital's intensive care unit
(ICU) for treatment of head injuries could not bring an EMTALA claim on the
basis that the hospital did not appropriately screen for his injured hip.9" The
court stated that "[a]fter the hospital made its screening examination of Col-
lins, it is quite obvious that it determined that an 'emergency medical
condition' did exist."93 The court then stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) "is
not intended 'to ensure each emergency room patient a correct diagnosis, but
rather to ensure that each is accorded the same level of treatment regularly
provided to patients in similar medical circumstances."' 94 Therefore, a
plaintiff's EMTALA claim that a medical screening examination was "inap-
propriate" may not succeed if the hospital demonstrates that the examination
resulted in a diagnosis---even if problems remain undiagnosed or if the diag-
nosis was wrong. The Tenth Circuit has stressed that when doctors screen neg-
ligently, the appropriate remedy is a state medical malpractice suit.95
3. EMTALA's Requirement That Emergency Rooms Properly Stabilize
Patients Before Transfer
EMTALA claims also require a determination of whether the hospital
properly stabilized the patient before transfer. As noted previously, "transfer"
includes the discharge of a patient.96 EMTALA provides that stabilization
occurs if "no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the
88. Penhallegon, supra note 80, at 428-29.
89. 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 388. In Delaney, the patient was the victim of an automobile acci-
dent and the symptoms included complaints of chest pains. Id. She was transferred without diag-
nosis of the source of the pain, and subsequently required surgery to repair a transected aorta
which had clotted. Id. at 388-89. The patient was permanently paralyzed, and alleged that delay in
transferring her to a facility equipped to treat her contributed to the degree of her impairment. Id.
at 389. The Delaney court relied upon the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baber v. Hospital Corp.,
977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992), which held that "the enforcement section of § 1395dd only allowed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to act against a doctor to prevent participation in
Medicare programs and to seek sanctions in the form of civil monetary penalties." Delaney, 986
F.3d at 393 (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 876-78). The Tenth Circuit further noted that preclusion of
a cause of action against the physician is in line with the legislative history of the Act. Id. (citing
Baber, 977 F.2d at 876-78).
91. 963 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
92. Collins, 963 F.2d at 306-07. The court said, "The stated reason in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
for requiring a participating hospital to provide an 'appropriate medical screening examination' of
one suffering from injuries who presents himself at a hospital is to determine whether an 'emer-
gency medical condition exists.' Nothing more, nothing less." Id.
93. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
94. Id. (quoting Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041).
95. Id. at 308 (noting that the appropriate forum for a medical malpractice action was state
court, a recourse the plaintiff had pursued "and lost").
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).
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individual from a facility." '97 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged in Delaney that
a patient is stable at the time of discharge when there is no acute distress, no
indication of a worsening condition, and no apparent life-threatening risk."
Additionally, when a patient refuses to consent to treatment, a hospital has no
further obligation under EMTALA. 9
To prevail under EMTALA, the plaintiff must establish either that the
hospital failed to provide an appropriate medical screening or that the patient
was transferred prior to stabilization, but not both."o EMTALA, therefore,
imposes strict liability on hospitals, "subject [only] to those defenses available
in the Act."'0 Thus, the burden is on the hospital to establish, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that it did not violate the requirements of
EMTALA.' 2
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital 3
a. Facts
Mr. Repp, complaining of a rash, visited a physician who diagnosed
shingles and prescribed medication."° Later that day, Mr. Repp visited the
emergency room at Anadarko Municipal Hospital complaining of pain
throughout his left arm.0 5 Two nurses examined Repp and recorded his vital
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
98. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 392 (quoting Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271).
99. Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(b)(2)).
100. Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Abercrombie court held that it was harmless error that the jury instructions seemed to infer
that the jury must find both in order for the plaintiffs to prevail. Id. The court noted that in re-
sponse to two special interrogatories, the jury responded that they found that the defendant hospi-
tal had provided an appropriate medical screening, and that they did not find that the deceased had
been transferred in an unstable condition. Id. at 681-82.
101. Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713. "Section 1395dd(a) contains mandatory language. Under the
statute, the hospital must provide for medical screening if a request is made." Id. (citing Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989)); see also
Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 680-81 (noting that while the word "negligently" appears in the part of
EMTALA addressing civil monetary fines, it is not in the part of the act which provides for civil
enforcement by an injured plaintiff). The court found the omission significant, noted that Congress
could have said "negligently" in the civil enforcement provision, but did not, and stated that the
court would not opt to rewrite the section. Id. at 681. The Abercrombie court further noted that the
word "negligently" does not appear in either § 1395dd(a) or (c), which provide for an appropriate
medical screening and stabilization before transfer. Id. Acknowledging the statute's "mandatory
language" as enunciated in Stevison, the Abercrombie court held that "these two requirements
impose a 'strict liability' on a hospital which violates those requirements." Id.
102. See Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681 (using the preponderance of the evidence standard for
both appropriate medical screening and stabilization before transfer); Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713
(holding that once plaintiff demonstrated she had requested a medical screening, she met the bur-
den, and that the burden then shifted to the defendant hospital to prove that the request for treat-
ment had been withdrawn, a showing which would defeat a claim that a hospital failed to stabilize
a patient prior to transfer).
103. 43 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).




signs."° Mrs. Repp informed the nurses that her husband had a history of
cardiac bypass surgery. 7 Upon telephone consultation, the outpatient treat-
ing physician prescribed two medications administered in the emergency room
by injection." The emergency room staff released Repp, who died that night
in his sleep of cardiopulmonary arrest due to coronary artery disease." The
plaintiffs, Mrs. Repp and the couple's children, alleged that Repp did not
receive an "appropriate medical screening" in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(a)." ° They further alleged that the defendant hospital failed to prop-
erly stabilize Repp prior to his discharge, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§
1395dd(b) and (c)." The district court dismissed the malpractice cause of
action against the individual physician." 2 The only issue on appeal was
whether the emergency room failed to provide an "appropriate medical screen-
ing" in violation of EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)." 3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
case. In doing so, the court interpreted the term "appropriate medical screen-
ing."' ' 4 The plaintiffs contended that the word "appropriate" required "hospi-
tals to provide a uniform minimum level of care to each patient seeking emer-
gency room care.""' 5 The defendants, in turn, reasoned that a substantive
reading of "appropriate" would convert EMTALA into a national malpractice
statute, in contravention of Congressional intent."6 Noting that "the Act 'is
neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute,""' 7 the court stated that "sec-
tion 1395dd(a) precludes the adoption of a standard tantamount to a federal
malpractice statute.""' Rather, § 1395dd(a) requires that an appropriate med-
ical screening examination be "within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department."' Thus, the court stated, the section "does not re-
quire a hospital to provide a medical screening in the abstract," but, rather
"the statute's requirement is hospital-specific, varying with the specific cir-
cumstances of each provider."'' 0 The decision stated that:
[A] hospital defines which procedures are within its capabilities when







112. Id. The doctor asserted that he could not be sued as an individual physician under the
EMTALA. Id. The lower court relied on Delaney in granting his motion to dismiss. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 522. For statutory language, see supra note 82.
115. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1994)). For a discussion of this
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emergency room. Indeed, hospitals, and not reviewing courts, are in
the best position to assess their own capabilities. Thus, a hospital
violates section 1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard
procedures.''
Slight or de minimus variations by a hospital from its standard screening pro-
cedures do not violate hospital policy.'
In dicta, the court noted Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America,'13 a Fourth
Circuit decision in which that court refused to "foreclose the possibility that a
future court faced with such a situation may decide that the hospital's standard
was so low that it amounted to no 'appropriate medical screening.""1 24 The
Tenth Circuit stated that its holding in Repp "clearly rejects the possibility left
open by the Fourth Circuit in Baber. A court should ask only whether the
hospital adhered to its own procedures, not whether the procedures were ade-
quate if followed."'25
The court found the Anadarko Hospital's policy required its emergency
room staff to compile a history for each patient including pre-existing condi-
tions, medication, and allergies.'26 The court also found that the hospital's
nurses knew Repp had a history of heart disease and that he was taking Zantac
and Phenaphen. 2' The plaintiffs argued that the hospital failed to take a
complete medical history and the nurses did not ask for a complete list of
medications.'28 The court determined these were "minimal variations from
the hospital's emergency room policy" and they "did not amount to a violation
of the hospital's standard screening procedures."'
' 29
2. Urban v. King 3'
a. Facts
Urban, diagnosed as having a high-risk pregnancy because she was carry-
ing twins, underwent periodic stress tests. 3' Urban's physician, Dr. King,
referred her to the Central Kansas Medical Center where she received a nonre-
active stress test which indicated no fetal movement, fetal heart tones in the
150s, and normal maternal vital signs.'3 2 Upon consultation with a physician,
the nurse who administered the test instructed Urban to return the next morn-
ing for another stress test.'33 She left the hospital at about 8 P.M. and re-
turned the next morning, when the biophysical profile indicated that neither
121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. at 523.
123. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
124. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 n.4 (quoting Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7).
125. Id.




130. 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994).





fetus was moving or breathing, and one fetus had no fetal heart tone.'34 A
Caesarean section resulted with one twin stillborn, and the other suffering
brain damage.'35 Urban and her husband alleged that the medical center vio-
lated EMTALA'3 6 by releasing ("transferring") Urban when an unstabilized
emergency medical condition existed.' The district court granted the medi-
cal center's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. 3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The issue on
appeal was whether the defendant medical center released Urban with an
emergency medical condition which should have been stabilized under
EMTALA' 39 The court stated the statute requires actual knowledge of an
unstabilized emergency medical condition if a plaintiff is to prove liability."4
"The hospital cannot be held to stabilize an emergency situation without
knowing an emergency exists .... A facial reading of section 1395dd(e)(1)
requires some manifestation of acute symptoms so the hospital would know of
the condition.'1
4'
Under § 1395dd(e)(1)(A), the court found that an "emergency medical
condition" did not manifest itself in Urban's case because she was not in pain
and demonstrated no severe symptoms at the time the hospital released her
from the emergency room. 42 The court distinguished Abercrombie v. Osteo-
pathic Hospital Founders Ass'n143 from Urban, because the former "did not
address whether the hospital could be in violation of section 1395dd(c) if it
did not have the knowledge of the [patient's] emergency medical condi-
tion."'" Thus, the court stated, "The statute's stabilization and transfer re-
quirements do not apply until the hospital determines the individual has an
emergency medical condition."' 
45
134. Id. at 524-25.
135. Id. at 525.
136. The language of the Act on which the court relied provides:
(c) Restricting transfers until individual stabilized
(1) Rule
If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has
not been stabilized .... the hospital may not transfer the individual unless-
(A)(i) the individual . . .after being informed ... in writing requests
transfer to another medical facility,
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency depart-
ment at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical
person . . . has signed a certification ... after a physician ... coun-
tersigns the certification ....
Id. at 524 n.l (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)).




141. Id. at 525-26.
142. Id. at 526.
143. 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991).
144. Urban, 43 F.3d at 526.
145. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit found further support for its holding in § 1395dd(c),
which applies only after the requirements of § 1395dd(b) are satisfied." The
latter section provides that a hospital must comply with the § 1395dd(c) stabi-
lization requirements if it "determines that the individual has an emergency
medical condition.' 47 Thus, "[t]he statute's stabilization and transfer require-
ments do not apply until the hospital determines the individual has an emer-
gency medical condition."" In arriving at its holding, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to read the language of § 1395dd(c) in isolation of the other sections of
the statute as the Urbans urged. 49
The court further rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that holding hospitals to
an "actual knowledge" standard would result in a deliberate failure to diagnose
at all, in order to avoid EMTALA liability. 5 ' Section 1395dd(a), which re-
quires that the hospital conduct an appropriate medical screening, should pre-
clude such a result.'' Furthermore, the court noted that if a hospital con-
ducts an appropriate screening and fails to diagnose, the plaintiff would have a
state malpractice claim.'52
C. Analysis
When the Tenth Circuit stated in Repp that "a hospital violates §
1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard procedures,"'53 it cited
authority which also determined that a plaintiff must show her treatment was
different from that of other patients,'54 or that the medical workers' motives
were "inappropriate."' 55 Because the burden of proof should be on the defen-
dant in these cases, a rejection of the premise that the plaintiff must show
disparate treatment is appropriate. The Tenth Circuit's standard does not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove "bad motive" in order to prevail, but requires only
a showing that the hospital did not follow its own procedures. The fact that
the Tenth Circuit has rejected the Fourth Circuit's determination that low
standards may not constitute "appropriate medical screening" means that state
tort actions are the only assurance that hospitals will promulgate and adhere to
adequate procedures for emergency rooms.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)).
148. Id. (finding that the hospital's lack of actual knowledge of the emergency medical condi-
tion absolved it of liability in conjunction with § 1395dd(b)).
149. Id. (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 219 (1991)). The court agreed with
the Urbans that reading the EMTALA sections in isolation of each other, the facts that (1) Urban
went to a hospital, (2) there was an emergency condition, (3) she was not stabilized, and (4) she





153. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
154. Id. at 522 n.6 (citing Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994)).




Urban relies on a hospital to admit to "actual knowledge" of an emergen-
cy condition in order for a court to find that a hospital violated § 1395dd(c)
by transferring an unstabilized patient. The Urban court stated hospitals are
not likely to abuse the "actual knowledge" standard because of the screening
requirements of § 1395dd(a). 5 6 But in almost the same breath, the court
stripped the screening requirements to a more-than-minimal violation of the
hospital's own operating procedures. 5 Because hospitals determine what
constitutes adequate procedures, they will weigh low standards for EMTALA
claims so as to avoid liability under the Tenth Circuit, yet not admit to such a
low standard of care that they will be vulnerable to potential state malpractice
suits.
D. Other Circuits
1. Appropriate Medical Screening
In defining "appropriate medical screening," circuit courts split on the
question of whether a plaintiff must prove an improper motive or nonmedical
reason for a hospital's disparate treatment. The Sixth Circuit required an im-
proper motive showing in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group.'58 Cleland
involved a fifteen-year-old with cramps and vomiting, who was misdiagnosed
with the flu and died due to complications resulting from his undiagnosed in-
testinal disorder. 9 In holding for the hospital, this oft-cited opinion stated
that:
"Appropriate" is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dic-
tionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the
drafting of legislation. Who, after all, can be found to stand up for
"inappropriate" treatment or actions of any sort? Under the circum-
stances of the act, "appropriate" can be taken to mean care similar to
care that would have been provided to any other patient, or at least
not known by the providers to be insufficient or below their own
standards .... "[A]ppropriate" must... be interpreted to refer to the
motives with which the hospital acts. If it acts in the same manner as
it would have for the usual paying patient, then the screening provid-
ed is "appropriate" within the meaning of the statute."
The primary case rejecting Cleland's improper motive requirement is the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corp.'6' In Gatewood, the hospital misdiagnosed and discharged a man who
156. Urban, 43 F.3d at 526.
157. Repp was decided on Dec. 19, 1994; Urban was decided on Dec. 20, 1994; and Repp
cites Urban as authority.
158. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
159. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268.
160. Id. at 271-72 (noting that reasons, other than indigence, for which an emergency room
might give less than standard care include "prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the
patient; distaste for the patient's condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or antagonism
between the medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient's occupation; or political
or cultural opposition").
161. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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complained of pain radiating down his left arm and into his chest and who
died the next morning of a heart attack. 62 The D.C. Circuit stated that:
[A] hospital fulfills the "appropriate medical screening" requirement
when it conforms in its treatment of a particular patient to its stan-
dard screening procedures .... The motive for such departure is not
important to this analysis, which applies whenever and for whatever
reason a patient is denied the same level of care provided others and
guaranteed him or her by subsection 1395dd(a). 63
The Fourth Circuit explicitly adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's
standard in Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n.' 6 The Fourth Circuit noted
that EMTALA applies to "anyone," and stated if plaintiffs had the burden of
proving an improper motive, it would be "virtually impossible" for them to
prevail. 65 The court required the plaintiff, however, to make a threshold
showing of differential treatment."6 To rebut that showing, a hospital may
show either that the patient in fact received the same treatment as other pa-
tients or, in the alternative, that a physician did not order or perform a test or
procedure because, as a matter of medical judgment, she did not feel it was
necessary or reasonable. 67 The court also noted that, in accordance with
Baber, a hospital is required to have screening procedures and that failure to
have them could constitute a per se violation of EMTALA.' 6
The Tenth Circuit, in Repp, found itself in accord with the District of
Columbia and Fourth Circuits when it held that "a hospital violates section
1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard procedures."'" The
Tenth Circuit, however, expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's determination
that excessively low standards could expose the hospital to liability. 7
The Ninth Circuit did apply the Fourth Circuit's minimum standards rule.
In Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 7' the Ninth Circuit stated that courts
have unanimously held the test applied to screening standards to be an objec-
tive determination that the procedure was the same received by other patients,
162. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1039.
163. Id. at 1041.
164. 42 F.3d 851, 857 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F.
Supp. 538, 544 (E.D.N.C. 1991) and Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 769 F. Supp. 1030, 1034
(N.D. 111. 1991) as also adopting Gatewood's rejection of an improper motive requirement).
165. Id. at 857-58.
166. Id. at 858.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 858 n.4.
169. Power predates Repp by one week.
170. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 n.4. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Some commentators have criticized defining "appropriate" in terms of the hospital's
medical screening standard because hospitals could theoretically avoid liability by pro-
viding very cursory and substandard screenings to all patients, which might enable the
doctor to ignore an emergency medical condition.... Even though we do not believe it
is likely that a hospital would endanger all of its patients by establishing such a cursory
standard, theoretically it is possible. Our holding, however, does not foreclose the possi-
bility that a future court faced with such a situation may decide that the hospital's stan-
dard was so low that it amounted to no "appropriate medical screening"....
Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7 (citations omitted).
171. 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995).
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and not whether the medical profession would deem the procedure as ade-
quate.'72 The court noted that EMTALA's statutory language precluded a
"national standard of care in screening patients,"'73 but held a hospital none-
theless has a duty under EMTALA to screen at more than a minimal level,
which would be inappropriate."'
The Eighth Circuit held, in Williams v. Birkeness'75 that "appropriate"
means "uniform treatment rather than correct diagnosis,"'7 6 and that the bur-
den is on the plaintiff to prove disparate treatment.'77 Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit held the plaintiff must prove that the hospital administered substandard
screening procedures to an indigent patient vis A vis a paying patient.'
2. Proper Stabilization Before Transfer
With regard to stabilization before transfer, the Tenth Circuit agrees with
other circuits that a plaintiff must show that the emergency room staff had
actual knowledge of an unstabilized emergency medical condition. Courts
often cite Cleland for the proposition that "[i]f the emergency nature of the
condition is not detected, the hospital cannot be charged with failure to sta-
bilize a known emergency condition."'79 Cleland defines "the vague phrase
'emergency medical condition"" 8 as "a condition within the actual knowl-
edge of the doctors on duty or those doctors that would have been provided to
any paying patient."''
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baber agreed with Cleland that actual
knowledge must exist. The Baber opinion stated that to prevail on a claim that
a hospital violated EMTALA's transfer provisions, the plaintiff must show that
(1) there was an emergency medical condition; (2) there was actual knowledge
by hospital staff of that condition; (3) the patient was transferred without
stabilization; and (4) there was no patient consent to such transfer, nor were
certification and transfer procedures followed."2 The District of Columbia
Circuit also held that absent the diagnosis of an emergency medical condition,
EMTALA's stabilization and transfer requirements do not apply.
8 3
172. Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7).
175. 34 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 1994).
176. Williams, 34 F.3d at 697.
177. Id. Disparate treatment is an "essential element" of the claim. Absent evidence presented
by the plaintiffs, the defendant need not "disprove the ... claim by showing all patients were
treated the same." Id.
178. Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
179. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Gossling v. Hays Medical Ctr.,
1995 WL 254269, at *9 (D. Kan. 1995); Richmond v. Community Hosp., 885 F. Supp. 875, 881
(W.D. Va. 1995).
180. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268.
181. Id. at 269.
182. Baber, 977 F.2d 883.
183. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
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CONCLUSION
Current case law indicates that plaintiffs must rely on state law for access
to quality health care. Hem requires Colorado to fund abortions in accordance
with the Hyde Amendment, but the benefit is illusory because of the extremely
low number of women affected. Further, in the absence of the Hyde Amend-
ment and its dictates of medically necessary categories of abortions, a state
may define medical necessity. Judicial relief in this area appears to be limited
to arguments that states make an arbitrary and discriminatory distinction in the
context of funding therapeutic abortions, between indigent women who are the
victims of rape or incest, and other indigent women who become pregnant.
Repp and Urban do not radically depart from other circuits; most courts
agree that EMTALA only restricts patient dumping, and is not a national
malpractice statute. Repp goes the furthest in allowing hospitals total discretion
in setting their own standards. Patients must rely on accreditation standards for
licensing emergency rooms to be assured that an adequate standard of care is
provided. Ultimately, state courts, through medical malpractice actions, must
ensure acceptable standards and levels of care.
Terry J. Wechsler
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